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I. ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL FACTS 
Connie Taylor, filed the ori,ginal verified petition in the probate court on November 12, 
2004, requesting the probate comi to appoint her clients as trustees of the Theodore L. Jolmson 
Revocable Tmst. 111e petition was executed by R. John Taylor as a verification of the facts 
contained in the petition. Page 2 of the verified petition states under oath, "the petitionei·'s 88-
year-old mother, Helen Taylor, is the sole remaining beneficiar:v of this trust by 1iirtue of the 
terms of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity Agreement." 
Earlier on September 9, 2004 Dnllan Taylor in response to a question asking him to 
provide in his own words the effect of the Disclaimer Ab'Teement, provided deposition testimony 
under oath, which recited, "And Taylor, all children are disclaiming interest in favor of their 
mother, Helen Taylor, so that she can get tlie remainder ofber assets in the Tmst." ( R. Vol I. p. 
000582). 
TI1irty-two days later after verifying his petition before the probnte corni, John Taylor 
provided deposition testimony on December 14, 2004 that his mother was to receive either the 
land or any dollar amount awarded as a result of the lawsuits ( R. Vol 1. p. 2008). 
On January 31, 2005 approximately 80 days after John Taylor executed the ve1ified 
petition, Reed Taylor provided deposition testimony under oath, and in response to questioning 
about wbo would receive the benefits of tbe litigation, responded that his mother "probably gets 
it all". In addition Reed Taylor further provided deposition testimony under oath regarding who 
would get the proceeds relating to the second lawsuit, by testifying, "My intent is -- I'm not going 
to say exactly how it's going to be disbursed. My intent wolllcl be for my mother.... Well, like I 
said, as for as, llh -- I haven't talked to, specifically, the ones that are ollt of town. As faros John 
and I ore concerned, uh, we're doing it for our mother, so" When asked directly about his 
brother's anticipated benefits from the litigation, Reed Taylor provided deposition testimony 
under oatl1 by stating, "We're not looking for money out of it, if that's where you're going". 
( R. pp. 000566, 000567). 
On Moy 2, 2005, John Taylor provided testimony before the Honorable Judge Beiter 
stating under oath, ''Well, piimarily, to pursue the claim for the trust. We have always thought it 
was a valid claim because I think that, for the benefit -- my mother is the beneficiary of tbe trust, 
and we expect tbat we will eventually win on this cfaim." ( R. pp. 000348, 000350). 
Judge Wilper entered his Memorandum Decision and Order on July 28, 2005 and beld the 
Taylor Brothers, now with st:mding as trustees, had waived iights to rescind the contract as "once 
a pmiy treats a contract as valid after the appearance of facts giving rise to a right ofrecision, the 
right of recision is waived.'' ( R. p. 000649 ln. 10). 
The Eagle real est::ite market unclenvent a huge increase in bnd valuations stariing in 
2005. The nrnrket 2006 was just full on fire. Almost out of control. 'rr ou coulcl just pretty much 
nsme yorn· price for almost anything. (Tr.2/3/11 pp. 212 In. :?.1 thru :?.14 ln. :?.5). 
' 
During tlie course of tlie depositions ofJohn Taylor and Dall an Taylor, the deponents 
were represented by Connie Taylor. No objections were interposed at the deposition of Jolm 
Taylor regarding his ,mswers relating to questions regc1rding who was entitled to c1ny proceeds 
involving the Iitig21tion. The deposition was taken after tlie Disclaimer Agreement was executed 
(Tr. 2/3/11pp.375 In. 15 tlrn.1 377 In. 25). No ccllTections were mc1de relating to any deposition 
answers of John Taylor or Dall an Taylor relating to questions and answers as to wl10 was tl1e 
beneficiary under the trust after the Disclaimer A,greement was executed (Tr. 2/3/11 pp. 3 78 1n. 1 
thru 378 In. 20). 
There never w::1s any supplementc1tion of t11e Taylor brotliers' discovery in tlie Judge 
YVilper case relating to m1y clianges to tbe benefici:.iry status after the Disclaimer Agreement w:1s 
executed. There were specific requests for discovery directed to the Taylor brothers in the Judge 
Wilper nrntter specificc11ly relating to any amendments to the Johnson trust. During the course of 
litigation the Taylor brot11ers provided no discovery supplements indicating there were any 
amendments or changes to the trust which relating to the beneficiary status. ((Tr. 2/4/1 I p. 63 ln. 
7 thru ln. 25). The original trust Agreement provided Helen Taylor would only receive income 
from the corpus, which was discretionary, but under no circumstances was Helen Taylor to 
receive anything more than income from the trust. 
On April 13, 2009, Connie Taylor representing lier prior husband, John Taylor, and her 
prior brotl1er-in-law Dall an Taylor, both individually and as tmstees of the trnst provided her 
briefing before Judge Greenwood indicating "that petition contained a typographical error; it 
stated that Helen Taylor was "the sole remaining beneficiary of the Theodore Johnson Trust by 
virtLte of the tern1s of a Disclaimer, Release and Indemnity A_l,rreement," \vhen it should have 
stated tl1at she was the sole remaining direct beneficiary.'' ( R. p. 001289). 
II. ADDIHONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. i\re the Respondents entitled to their attorneys fees on appeal? 
Ill ARGUMENT 
A. The Independeut Action Requesting the Lower Court to Set Aside the Judgment on 
Beneficiaries' Claims Should Be Granted. 
The litigants before the Court all a,gree that the Taylor brothers had standing to pursue 
claims in the consolidated cases captioned Taylor v. Maile 146 Id. 705,201 P.3d 1282, (2009). 
The litigants are in serious disagreement over the effects of committing peijmy and obtaining 
money by false pretenses dming the course of litigation before .T udge Wilper. 
111e Respondents hove failed to address tl1e authority cited by Appellants contained in 
Vol l 2 Moore's Federal Practice § 60-21 ( 4)(b ), which provides that as officers of the court the 
commission of perjury in obtaining ajudgment is another species of "fraud upon tl1e comi". The 
Respondents point to the amended petition before the probate comi as a correction of the earlier 
verified petition. The amended petition before tbe probate comi was filed without leave of comi 
and was done as a unilateral unde1iaking immediately prior to the hearing. ( R. p. 001361). The 
Respondents alJege the amended petition before the probate cowi acts to nullify the ptior ve1ified 
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petition by Joh11 Tc1ylor, ,cmd the sworn deposition testimony of all of the Taylor brothers some 
six months earlier. The filing of the amended petition was the first example of the Taylor 
brothers and tbeir counsel playing loose and fast with the judicic1l system. 
The mnended petition filed in tl1e probate comi executed on April 18, '.2005 as a verified 
pleading by Jolrn Taylor, desc1ibed the interests of the Taylor brothers as "persons who are 
sought to be appointed are contingent beneficimies of the Theodore L. Johnson Revocc1ble 
Trust". ( R. 000840). Tl1e Taylor brotl1ers lrnd p1ior to the execution of the Disclaimer 
A,;•reement, described themselves in January 2004, as "pfaintiffs are residual beneficiaries of the 
Theodore L. Johnson Trust". (trio] exhibit 110 p. 380). Before the execution of the Disclaimer 
A,;•Teernent, the Taylor brothers were residual beneficiaries destined to share in tbe corpus. This 
is the status they disclaimed. However, and this is crucial, there was nothing contingent about 
their status under tl1e tem1s of tbe trust. If anything was contingent it was Helen Taylor's 
potential income interest which was solely discretionmywith tbe trustee(s) under the terms of the 
trust. The Taylor brothers, under the trust, were ,guaranteed to receive corpus of the trust, unless 
of course they disclaimed tbeir interest, which is exactly what the paper trail establishes. 
Respondents point out that tl1e Honorable Judge Greenwood believed the core of the 
appellants' case was centered on tbe misrepresentation by the Taylor brothers before Judge Beiter 
in tbe proceeding to obtain their judicial appointment as trustees. (Clark & Feeney Reply B1iefp. 
1). The Taylor brothers in all likelihood would have been appointed successor trustees regardless 
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of tbe initial verified petition or the amended petition. Tbe verified petition of November 2004 is 
relevant to our understonding of the Taylor brothers' state of mind as to whetber they considered 
themselves beneficiaries of tbe trust after the execution of Disclaimer A_f,rreement. 
Judge Greenwood apparently believed tbat the appellants' case centered upon tbe 
misrepresentations in Judge Beiter's court. 
Althougb the argument is not always e:1sy to follow, Berkshire's claims presented 
here all hinge on tbe asse1iion tlrnt tl1e Taylors and their counsel committed a 
fraud on Judge Beiter by filing a petition for appointment as Trustees tbat 
contained a false statement. This statement somehow led Judge Beiter to appoint 
tl1e Taylors as Trustees, giving tbem standing to b1ing tbe suit wbich ultimately 
led to Judge Wilper's determination tbat the underlying real estate transaction was 
void. This led to tbe loss of the prope1iy. ( R. 001373). 
In fact Judge Greenwood should lrnve realized, tlrnt tbe Appellants' case centered upon 
the fact that the Taylor brotl1ers aJleged to Judge Wilper to be something tbey were not. They 
mjsrepresented themselves to Judge Wilper's Comi, as beneficimies. The only significm1t event 
in the probate proceedings was the November '.2004 verified petition drafted by Connie Taylor 
and executed under oath by her husband John Taylor. The verified petition, togetber with otber 
evidence establishes that the Taylor brothers were no longer beneficiaries after their execution of 
the Disclaimer A6ireement, yet they represented to Judge Wilper tlmt they were beneficiaries. 
Judge Beiter's appointment of the Taylor brotbers, as trnstees, in May '.2.005 did not afford tbe 
Taylor brotl1ers tl1e light to commit pe1jury in Judge Wilper's Comi regarding their status as 
beneficiaries in 2006. Tl1e admission under oath in probate comi is impo1iant because it 
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establishes the Taylor brothers' reversal of JJOSition when they falsely claimed to be beneficiaries 
in Janumy 2006 before Judge Wilper. That fr:rnd upon the court led to the entry of the Judgment 
on Beneficiaries' Claims. Neither the Taylor brothers nor their counsel ever advised J11dge 
VVi!per that they previously admitted to disclaiming their status as residual beneficiaries. This 
reversal set the stage for tI1e fraud upon tbe comi. As a result of the Judgment on Beneficiaries' 
Claims, the Appe1lants were not able to present their case against the trust. 
The amended petition filed in]Jrobate couri in April 2005, does not alter the sworn 
testimony of Dall an Taylor, Reed Taylor and John Taylor stating that they knew they were no 
longer beneficiaries after t11e execution of tl1e Disclaimer Agreement. TI1eir counsel also lrnew 
tlrnt the Taylor brothers were 110 longer beneficiaries of t11e trust as a result of tbe Disclaimer, 
Release and Indemnity A6•rnement. W11en a pleading is amended or withdrawn, the superseded 
po1iion disappears from the record as a judicial admission. It neve1iheiess exists as an utterance 
once seriously made by a pariy, and when admitted in evidence may be properly considered by 
tl1e corni orjrny as an item of evidence in the case. Swanson v. State ofidaho 83 Id. 126,358 
P.2d 387 (1960) citing Slmriliff v. Extension Ditch Co., 14 Idaho 416, 94 P. 574; Anderson 11• 
I-loops, 52 Idaho 757, 19 P.1.d 908; C. I. T Corp. v. Elliott, 66 Idaho 384, 159 P.2d 891; Stout v. 
le1cNmy, 75 Ida11o 99, 267 P.2d 625. 
Tbe recent case of Allied Bail Bonds, Inc. v. County of Kootenai, --- P.3d ----, 2011 YVL 
2652475(2011), cited by the Respondents does not alter the established case lmv cited in 
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Swanson, supra. An amendment to the pleadings serves to replace the prior pleading as to 
matters involved in those proceedings. The probate proceedings had nothing to do with 
possession or title to the Linder Road property. It was a proceeding for the appointment of the 
Taylor brothers as successor trnstees only. However, once a statement is made under oath it can 
be properly considered in all future legal proceedings to establish the intention of the party 
making such a statement under oath. The amended petition clear·Iy was inconsistent with the 
prior verified petition and the Taylor brothers' deposition testimony. Clearly inconsistent sworn 
statements by John Taylor are relevant to the court's understanding of who was the beneficiary 
after the Disclaimer Agreement. J olm Taylor signed the original probate petition under oath and 
32 days later provided similar deposition testimony that his mother would receive the benefits of 
the litigation. The filing of the amended probate petition demonstrates playing loose and fast 
with the judicial system as the Taylor brothers ar1d their counsel made a detennination in April 
2005 to cbange course and assert that they remained contingent beneficiaries so they might 
benefit from that status and take advantage of their pending appeal. 
There is considerably more evidence of the commission of perjury than the initial verified 
petition in tbe probate proceeding. As early as March 2003, Connie Taylor, representing tl1e 
Taylor brothers lmew that her clients were considering disclaiming any remainder interest in their 
Uncle Ted's trust in favor of their motl1er. She wrote the letter to TI1omas Maile, that provided, 
" .... children are all considering disclaiming any remainder interest in their uncle Ted's trnst so 
8 
that the trust proceeds can be clist1ibuted to their mothers without delay ... .I just want to be certain 
th:it tl1ere won't be a situation down the line where someone claims that they would not have 
disclaimed their interest if they had a better idea of the amount of money that was involved." ( R. 
000535). 
The Taylor Brothers in their successful attempt to gain control of the trust, after their 
initial complaint brought as beneficiaiies was dismissed, provided ::idclitional evidence that tbey 
were plam1ing to disclaim their interests in the trust. On April 14, 2004, Connie Taylor drafted a 
letter to Beth Rogers' attorney Bmi Ho.rwood which est::iblished that her clients, the Taylor 
brotl1ers, would disclaim their rights as beneficiaries of the trust in exchange for the successor 
nominated trustee, Beth Rogers' cooperation and suJTender of her trustee status, which would 
al.low the Taylor brothers to gain control of the trust ( R. 000561). The combinotion oftl1e two 
letters demonstrates that tl1e Taylor brothers were intending to disclaim their interest in the trust 
as early as March 2003. Such a declaration against interest made in the April 2004 letter was 
more than just a warning that Beth Rogers, as trustee, could be released from liability if sl1e 
provided an affidavit, as argued by tl1e Taylor brothers in their reply brief (Taylor brothers' Reply 
Briefp. 21). The April '.2004 letter is consistent with the M::irch 2003 letter and consistent with 
tbe sworn deposition testimony of the T;:iylor brothers as well as tl1e original verified probate 
petition, in tbat it indicates tbeir intent to disclaim beneficiary status. 
The record has ample evidence th.rough deposition testimony that the Taylor brothers 
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treated tl1e Disclaimer A61--reement as extinguishing their beneficiary interests in the trust. All 
tlu·ee brothers provided testimony that demonstrated their intention and understanding of the 
Disclaimer A;·reement (see o.ppendix I to the Appellants' Opening B1ief). 
Cormie Taylor, as an officer of the court, engineered the process for her clients to gain 
control of the trust .:md lrnew her clients' intentions of disclaiming their interest in the tmst. 
Co1mie Taylor as counsel for the Taylor Brotl1ers sat through deposition testimony as her clients 
admitted that Helen Taylor was to receive the full benefits ofzmy litigation. Connie Taylor 
fmther knew that prior to the Disclciimer A,greement, Helen Tc!ylor had no right under the trust to 
receive any poriion of the trust co11Jus ( R. 000432 ln.9 thrn 25). The trust specifically provided 
that after the death of Ted Johnson, the trustee could pay to, or apply for the benefit of Helen 
Taylor, Hazel Fisher, Betty Farnworth, and Joyce Sel1ey, such sums from the income of their 
20% share of the corvus of the trust, as the Trustee deems reasonable for the maintenance, 
education, suppo1i and health of the said beneficiary drning tl1eir lifetime. Helen Taylor had no 
right to obtain any principal or COI]JUS of the trust, a fact well hown to the officers of the corni. 
Ultimately the Taylor brothers, aided by their attorneys, pe11)etrated perjmy upon the district 
court in filing their amended complaint representing that they were beneficiaries in January 2006 
after tbe Supreme Corni ruled that beneficiaries have a right to sue. 
49 CJS § 672. (20 I 1) Collusion, pe1jury, or other rnisconduct-Pe1jury and subornation 
of perjmy provides: 
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Pe1jmy or false sweming is a species of int1insic, not extrinsic, fraud, and hence 
the rnle against granting relief for pe1jury is in accordance with the general rule 
that relief in equity ordinarily cmrnot be had for intrinsic fraud. However, if tl1e 
pe1jury prevents a foll adversarial trial of the issues, or improperly procures the 
court's jurisdiction and judgment, then such peijrny is extrinsic and relief against a 
jud6'111ent so obtained may be had in equity .... 
it lrns been l1eld that where a l8wyer engages in a conspiracy to commit a fraud on 
tbe court by the production of fabiicated evidence, and by such means obtains a 
jud,gment, a cowi of equity may ,grant relief against the juc16•ment. Similarly, it bas 
been beld that subornation of pe1jury by an attorney or the intentional 
concealment of documents by an attorney constitute "ext1insic fraud," and allows 
a judgment to be set aside due to fraud upon the comi. 
The underlying case before Judge Wilper involved two consolidated matters. Tbe first 
action was filed by tl1e Taylor brotbers while tbey were still beneficiaries of the trust, in January 
2004. The second of tbe consolidated matters was tbe suit filed by tbe Taylor brothers as trustees 
of the trnst in July 2004 after the execution of the Disclaimer A6'Teernent. Ultimately, based 
upon tbe pe1jrny by t11e Taylor brothers that they remained beneficiaries of tbe trust, Judge 
Wilper entered his Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Jud61111ent on Beneficiaries' 
Claim on May 15, 2006. Tbe Order led to tl1e Judgment on Benefici:iries' Claims which was 
entered on July 2006. TI1e Judgment provided: 
This cause came on before the Honorable Ronald J. Wilper for l1earing on a 
Motion for Surnmaiy Jud,gment on tl1e Beneficiaries' Claim. B:ised upon tl1e 
findings of fact and conclusions oflaw contained withinthis Corni's May 15, 
2006 Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on Beneficiaries' 
Claim, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED 
as follmvs, 
... The title to the prope1ty commonly refe1Ted to as "tl1e Linder Rond prope1iy" 
and more paiiicularly desc1ibed in Paragraph 3 of this Judgment shall be quieted 
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to the Theodore L. Jolmson Revocable Trust, in fee simple ... 
The Defendants' remaining countercbims and affirnrntive defenses, all of which 
were based on eitlier equitable claims or the asse1iion that the Plaintiffs were 
wrongfully interfering with the Defendants' right to possess the Linder Road 
Prope1iy, are hereby dismissed. Specifically, those claims are as follows: 
A. Counterclaim I (to1iuous interference with contract between Defendants 
and thefr lending institution) 
B. Counterclaims VII and VIII (equitable estoppel and Quasi-Estoppel) .... 
( R. 000119). 
Thereafter tbe Appeilants attempted before Judge Wilper to have tbeir claims to tlie title 
against the trust adjudicated upon equitable principles. Judge Wilper entered bis Memorandum 
Decision and Order on July 25, 2006 again reiterating his position set fo1ib in the Juclf:.'ment on 
Beneficiaries' Claims. Tlie Memorandum Decision and Order of July 25, 2006 recited: 
Tbe Corni finds tbat tbe effect of the Comi' s imposition of a constmctive trust cm 
the Linder Road prope1iy is the reconveyance of the prope1iy to tlie Trust and tlie 
quieting of the title in favor of the Trust. See Klein v. Shaw, 109 Idaho 23 7, 240, 
706 P.2d 1348, 1351 (Ct. App. 1985) (holding that a pa1iy upon wbo a 
constrnctive trust is imposed "is treated as if he or she had been an express trnstee 
from foe date of tbe wrongful bolding and is required to reconvey the property to 
the plaintiff); see also I.C. § 6-410 (describing an action to quiet title as tbat 
"brought by any person against another who claims an estate or interest in real or 
personal property adverse to him, for the pUI])Ose of cleten11ining such adverse 
claim"). ( R. 000119). 
Tlie taking of tlie real prope1iy without any consideration of any oftlie equitable positions 
between the trust and appellants before Judge Wilper was solely a result of tbe pe1jury committed 
by tbe Taylor brothers in falsely asserting their role as residual beneficirnies of tbe trust in 2006. 
As stated by Justice Eismann in Taylor v. Maile II, "Mailes have not ar1:,'1.led on appeal tbat the 
appropriate remedy for closing the sale without corni approval would be to set aside only the 
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closing, rather than also setting aside the contn:ict of sale. Thus, we have not addressed the 
appropriate scope of the remedy for a violation oflclaho Code § 68-108(b )". The Mail es lost 
their opp01iunity to address before Judge Wilper any issues between the tmst and the Appellants. 
The Taylor brothers' perjury prevented a full adversarial trial of the issues before Judge Wilper, 
CJS § 672, supra. The above authority does not require that one losing rights to a fair and full 
adjudication as a result of peijury must attempt to coITect the same by appeal. Respondents argue 
that the Mailes filed their notice of appeal and raised this concept in Tayl01; v. Maile II (Taylor 
brothers' Reply Brief p. 4). Only standing was argued as being affected by t11e TayJor brothers' 
misconduct, however, no issue was raised relating to any cause of action related to the criminal 
activity of Taylor brothers or their attorneys. The merits of the claims were never presented nor 
determined. Standing is focused not on the merits of the issues raised, but upon the pmiy who is 
seeking the relief. Miles v. Idaho Power Co., 116 Id. 635, 641, 778 P.2d 757, 763 (1989). 
Tl1e appellants were assured by the grantor of the trust and tl1e successor trustees, the 
Rogers, that the trust Yvould stand by the transaction ( R. 000539). TI1e Motion for Summary 
Judgment in February 2006 was based solely upon tl1e Taylor brothers' criminal conduct in 
committing perjury and obtaining money by false pretenses based upon the asse1iion that they 
were residual beneficiaries in 2006. ( R. pp. 000655, 000660). 
Tbe Respondents have c1rgued this matter is analogist to the case of Rae v. Bunce 
145 Id. 798, 186 P.3d 654 (2008). (Clark & Feeney Reply Brief p. 9). Tl1e Rae matter involved 
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a claim of a frn.uc! upon the comt, based upon opposing counsel's submission of a proposed order 
by mail not by motion. The present matter involves a complaint rrgainst officers of the corni who 
are alleged to have rrcted in the following ma1111er: 
That all clefendnnts, acted with oppressive, fraudulent, wanton, malicious or 
outrageous conduct ns alleged above. That defendants cJcted in a manner tlrnt 
was"an extreme deviation from rerrsonable standards of conduct, cJnd that the act 
was perf01111ed by the defendants with Eln understanding of or disregard for its 
likely consequences" and tlrnt the clefenclonts acted with an extremely ham1ful 
state of mind, whetber that be tenned "malice, oppression, frm1d or 6•ross 
negligence", "malice, oppression, wanto1mess;" or simply "deliberate and 
willful." Tlrnt defendants well lrnew that tl1e above conduct would be oppressive 
as to tbe plaintiffs and others. ( R. 000080). 
Tbe present matter deals ,vith pe1jury, subordination of perjury and obtElining money by 
false pretenses. The two matters are as different as clay and night. The pmiy asse1iing a claim of 
fraud on the cornt must establish tbat rn1 unconscionable plan or scheme was used to improperly 
infhience the cornt's cl ecision and that such acts prevented the losing party from fully and fairly 
presenting its case or defense. Rae, supra. 
Tbe burden is on the claimant to prove sufficient facts to set aside ajud6•rnent, by clear 
and convincing evidence. I.R.C.P., Rule 60(b)(3 ). Kulm v. Caldwell Bm1ker Landmark, Inc. 150 
Id. ?.40, 245 P.3d 992 (2010). The records clearly establisbes the Respondents actively engaged 
in conduct that played loose and fast witb the judicial system which ultimately amounted to 
criminal conduct. The criminal conduct oftbe respondents is clearly established in the record. 
The deposition testimony of Dallan Taylor is entirely consistent witb the verified petition 
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before the probate comi as executed in November 2004. The deposition testimony of John 
Taylor is entirely consistent with the verified petition before the probate comi as executed in 
November 2004. The deposition testimony of Reed Taylor is entirely consistent with the 
verified petition before the probate comi as executed in November 2004. The testimony of John 
Taylor before the probate cou1i in May 2005 is entirely consistent with the verified petition 
before the probate court as executed in November 2004. The letter of March 2003 authored by 
Cmmie Taylor is entirely consistent with the verified petition before the probate comi as 
executed in November 2004. The letter of April 2004 authored by Connie Taylor is entirely 
consistent with the verified petition before the probate court as executed in November 2004. 
However, if that verified petition of November 2004 contained a typo as arf,11.1ed hy the Taylor 
brothers, all the other testimony, and all the letters are in en-or. The recent case ofNC-D.H., Inc. 
v. Gamer, 218 P.3d 853 (Nev. 2009) provides: 
The most widely accepted definition, which we adopt, holds that the concept 
embraces only that species of fraud which does, or attempts to, subve1i the 
integrity of the cotni itself, or is a fraud pe111etrated by officers of the cou1i so that 
the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of 
adjudging cases ... and relief should be denied in the absence of such conduct. 
In addition to his duties to his clients, a lawyer also owes a duty of" loyalty to the 
corni, as an officer thereof, that demands integrity and honest dealing with the 
court. And whenhe departs from that standard in the conduct of a case he 
pe1vetrntes fraud upon the courC' We lawyers, judges, and practitioners alike are 
very ... concerned about how our profession is perceived. We're very proud of 
what we believe is an honorable profession and-we're very concerned when 
something like this happens. It hurts us all. It really does. 
If a party establishes that an unconscionable plan or scheme was used to in1properly 
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influence tbe corni's decision, and tbat sucli acts prevented the losing pmiy from fully and fairly 
presenting l1is case or defense, tl1en "fraud on the comi" exists. In re Paternity of Tomiki, 518 
N.E.2d 500 (Ind. App. 1988). Tl1e pa1iy asserting a cbirn offomcl 011 the court must establish 
tliat an unconsciomible plan or sclierne w::is used to improperly influence the corni's decision and 
tlrnt sucl1 acts prevented the losing party from fully :rnd fairly presenting its case or defense. 47 
Am.Jur. 2d, Juclb'11lents § 728 (2006). As stated in the case ofHmiford v. Ha1iford 53 Ohio 
App.2d 79,371 N.E.2d 591 (Ohio App. 1977): 
Vv'hile no precise definition offr:rnd upon tbe corni is possible, we believe, like 
most cornis considering the nrntter, that tl1e term as used in regard to obtaining 
relief from jucl6'111e11t must be 11::in-owly construed to embrnce only tliat type of 
conduct wbich defiles the comi itself, or fraud wl1icb is pe11Jetrated by officers of 
the court so as to prevent the judicial system from functioning in tl1e customary 
manner of deciding tl1e cases presented in an impmiial manner. 
The Appellants' independent action to set aside tbe Jud6'111ent on Beneficiaries' Claim 
should be f,'l"anted, as officers of the corni octively conspired to cornmitpeijury to obtain a 
jud6'111e11t thot precluded the appellants from presenting tl1eir full case in tl1e consolidated motter 
before Judge vVilper. 
B. The AppeUants Did Act in a Prndent Manner in Asserting the Taylor Brothers Lacked 
Standing and Did Act "'ithjn a Reasonable Thne in Filing Their Independent Action to Set 
Aside the Judgment on Beneficiaries' Clai1rn. 
In Idalrn our court's lrnve ruled tlrnt an independent action under I.R.C.P. 
60(b) may be brought ·within a reasom1ble time. Tbe question of reasonableness is ordinarily a 
question of fact to be resolved by tbe trier of fact. Claims brougl1t under I.R.C.P. 60(b) are not 
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bmTed by res judic::ita bernuse they are one of t11e recognized "avenues ... for attacking a 
jml6TJ11ent Davis v. Parish, 131 Id. 595, 961 P.2d 119 (1998). 
An independent action to set .1side a judgment can be b::ised 11pon the doctrine of "'fraud 
011 tl1e court". 7 Moore's Federal Pr::ictice 160.33. However, unlike an action for extrinsic fraud, 
an action for ''fraud on the court'' is not limited by facl1es and may be brougl1t at ,mytirne. 7 
Moore's Federal Pn1ctice 1\f 60.33. See In re Paternity ofTomiki, supra. "fraud 011 tl1e comt" is a 
cl::tim tlwt exists to protect tl1e inte61Tity of tlie judicial process, and tl1erefore a claim for fraud on 
tbe comi cannot be time-baned. 12 James We. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice§ 
60.21 [4J[g] & 11. 52 (3d ed.2009) (citing Lacewood v. Bowls, 46 FRAT 625,634 (D.D.C.1969). 
Tl1e appellants discovered the impact of the respondents' criminal activity while 
prepming tl1eir appelhmts' opening brief in Taylor v. Maile II. Six months had expired since 
Judge Wilper entered tbe Jud6rr11ent on Beneficiaries' Claim. Consequently, the only way for the 
Appellants to bring tl1e misconduct to tbe CoUii's attention was to present an argument refating 
to issues of stonding. Tl1e issue of standing is jmisdictionaJ, ,.md it may be raised at any time. 
Tungsten Holdings Inc., v. Drake, 143 Id. 69, 71, 137 P.3d 456,459 (2006). 
Respondents argue tl1at the appellants are simply attempting to take another bite ot the 
apple. This is m1true, fraud upon the court as an issue or claim has never been tried or 
cletennined, only standing was discussed and detennined. TJ1ere is no dispute that tl1e Tay) or 
brotbers bad standing to sue under Taylor v. Maile II. Standing does not confer a benefit upon a 
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Iitigo.nt to commit pe1jury, suborn pe1jury or obtain money by false pretenses. Stm1ding doe not 
confer a benefit upon o. litigant which results in the opposing party from fairly and fully having 
an o.djudication of [111 claims, including the claims in the Judge Wilper matter that may have 
existed between the appella11ts and tl1e trust. 
Appe11ants argument that the T::iylor brothers committed misconduct was advo.nced to 
defeo.t tbeir standing. The Supreme Cowi in Taylor v. Maile found the Taylors had standing. The 
appellants filed this oction in December 2007 while the appeal was stiII pending. 
Althougl1 tbe Jud6'111ent on Benefici;.iries' Claims was entered by Judge Wilper in July 
2006, there remained the question of unjust emichrnent which was tried in October 2006. Tirnt 
trial involved a claim of unjust enriclm1ent to the trust's rigbt to title, it liad nothing to do with 
the balancing of equities between the pmiies. The Appellants filed the independent action wbile 
the appeal v,:as pending, mindful of the requirement that Rule 60 (B) requires a "reasonable time" 
for tbe filing of tbe independent action. Given the fact that there remained issues to be tried 
before Judge Wilper and tbe appellants bad to prepare for sucb a trial, raising the matter as m1 
issue of standing and almost simultaneously filing an independent action to set osicle the 
_jud6rment was reasonable. Rule 60(b) is silent 2.s to when an independent ::i.ction can be 
maintained based upon criminal activity. To l1old otherwise would be tantc1111ount to concluding 
tbat all matters involving frnud and/or ciimin:tl conduct would have to be filed 1.vithin six months 
of the date of Judgment. 
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C. The Crirnirrurrl };,ctJivity of tine Respondents Defeats l.ny ,App!icatfrrnr of the Doctrine of 
Res Jucliiicata. 
-+ 7 Arn. Our. 2d Jud,gments § 53 7, provides the c1pprnprirrte stanclarcl in determining ifres 
juclicc1tc1 slwulcl ::1ppJy under tl1e fr1cts of this c::rse. The Appellants were denied the opportunity lo 
present tbeir case against the trust, before Judge Wilper. Tbe pe1:jury by the Taylor brothers gave 
Judge Wilpcr tbe wrongful impression th1t tJ-1e Taylorbrothers hc1cl a financial interest in the 
corpus of the trust in 2006. However, in trutJ1 uncl foct, the Toylor brothers b,1rgainecl away their 
interests in the trust to g,1in control of tbe trust, as trustees in July 2004. This wc1s done to 
c1clv::mce a lmvsuit by the trust wben tl1eir own L:iwsuit was dismissed. 
Tbe c,1se of Living Designs, Inc. v. E.I. Dupont de Numbers and Co., 431 F.3cl 353 
C.A9 (Hawaii 2005) provides law which explains that once fraud has been demonstrated in prior 
litigation, other non-fr,1ud cbims are permissible. T11e Living Design, supra, relied upon 
certificcition responses from the Hmvaii Supreme Court, and held at 373 of 431 F. 3d: 
The district comi also e1Toneously dismissed Plaintiffs' n011-frm1cl cl,1ims on the 
grounds of the litigation privilege. Mcltsuura III, 330 F. Supp.2d at l 128. In 
Matsuura lI, the Hawaii Supreme Court stated rhnt "Haw~1ii courts hz.ive upplied an 
absolute litigotion privilege in clefomation actions for words and writings that me 
mc1terial and pe1iinent to judicial proceedings." 73 P.3d ot 692. The cou1i 
examined tl1e policy considerations bebind the privilege and clecided not to 
expand tl1e protection of the privilege to claims outside of defamation actions, 
holding tbat "under J--h,vaii law. z.i p::1rty is not immune from liability for civil 
clarnages based upon that party's fraud engaged in during prior litig3tion 
proceedings." Id. 3t 700, 706. The court z.ippears to emplrnsize tl1at many of the 
policies ,:veighing against the applic:11ion of the privilege do so only ,vhen fraud 
was committecl in the prior proceedings. Id. at 693-99. In accordc111ce with the 
Hawaii' I Supreme Court's a113lysis, so long as a c:mse of action for fi·oud is 
19 
asse1ied, the litigation privilege does not protect subsequent litigation asserting 
other causes of action ste1runing from the fraud allegedly conu11itted in prior 
proceedings. Thus, we hold that Plaintiffs' non-fraud claims are not barred by the 
litigation privilege under Hawaii law. 
The action of the Respondents in misrepresenting their status as beneficiaiies of the trust 
in 2006 amounted to c1iminal conduct. C1iminal behavior as alleged in this case is more severe 
than fraud. The actions of the Respondents should not be tolerated as they demonstrate tampering 
with the administration of justice in Idaho and should be a clear exception to any defense of res 
judicata. The non fraud claims set forth in the amended complaint need to be resolved by the 
trier of fact and cannot be barred by res judicata. 
D. The Doctrine of Res Judicata Does Not Apply. 
Neither issue preclusion nor claim preclusion apply. Five factors are required in order for 
issue preclusion to bar the re-litigation of an issue detennined in a prior proceeding: (1) the party 
against whom the earlier decision was asse1ied had a full and fair oppmiunity to litigate the issue 
decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the p1ior litigation was identical to the issue 
presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the 
prior litigation; ( 4) there was a final judgment on the rne1its in the prior litigation; and (5) the 
paiiy against whom the issue is asse1ied was a paiiy or in p1ivity with a pmiy to the litigation. 
TicorTitleCo. v. Stanion 144Id.119, 157P.3d613,(2007). JusticeEismann'sconcurring 
opinion establishes that not all the issues were resolved in Taylor v. Maile IL As Justice 
Eismann indicated, the appropriate scope of the remedy for a violation of Idaho Code § 
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68-108(b) was not litigated nor clete1111jned cis an issue 011 Taylor v. Maile II. Tlie Respondents' 
criminal belrnvior ~mcl/or the effects thereof were not issues wl1icl1 were actually decided. 
Regardless ofwl1etl1er Jn issue is explicitly set fortli in tlie porty's brief as one oftbe issues on 
oppeal, if the issue is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any cogent argument or 
authority, it cannot be considered by tl1e ,1ppellote cowi. Tuylor v. AIA Services Corp. WL 
3904754 (Icbho 2011 ), Liponis v. Bacl1, 149 Jdal10 371,374, :234 P.3cl 696,698 (20l0). Issue 
preclusion does not apply to tl1e present matter. 
Jdal10 uses a tr::msac6011al approacl1 to claim preclusion. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. 
Kuenzli, 134 Jcl. 22'.2, 226, 999 P.2d 877, 88 I (2000). "Tl1e doctrine of claim preclusion bars not 
only subsequent re-litigntion of a claim previously rrsserted, but also subsequent re-litigation of 
any cloims rela.ting to tl1e same cause of action wl1icl1 were actually made or wliicl1 might have 
been made." Hinclmarsl1 v. Mock, 138 Jdal.10 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803,805 (2002). Claim preclusion 
has three elements: ( l) same pariies or tl1eir privies; ('.2) same claim; and (3) final judgment. 
Tacker Ti'tJe Co. v. Station, l 44 Idal10 119, 124, 157 P.3cl 613,618 (2007). W.1tkins v. Peacock 
145 Jc!. 704, 184 P.3cl 210 (2008). TI1eAppeilants Iiad no cause of :iction or cbim until Judge 
vVilper entered the Juc16'111ent on Beneficiaries' Claim. Moreover, tl1e Decision in Taylor v. 
McNicl10ls, 149 Jd. 826, 243 P.3d 642 (2010), l1olcls tliat a v::ilid claim against an opposing 
::i.ttorney must wait until tl1e conclusion of the underlying litigation. 
Tl1e Respo11clents argue tliat tl1e appelbnts' claims ::ire bmTed because tlie appellonts 
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arguobJy incurred "some domages" during the proceedings before Judge Wilper. The existence 
of objectively ascert::linJble injury is simply mi onalytic:il tool to be used in dete1111ining, as basis 
for the uccrnal of a profession:11 malpractice action, when "some damage" has occuJTcd. Stuard v. 
Jorgenson, 150Jd. 70l,249P.3cl 1156(2011). Tlie"sornedamage"rulehasbeenusedto 
determine if:m applicable statute oflimitc1tions :1pplies in a professional malpractice case. Tlie 
case c,fTaylor v. McNicbols, supra, establishes that because of the complexity of modern 
litigation, one cannot detennine the scope oLm opposing counsel's wrongful conduct until the 
underlying case is concluded. Tbis reasoning is applicable to the present rmtter in cleten11ining 
that neitlier cbirn preclusion nor "some damage" rnle applies in this case. Even througb the 
Respondents committed pei:jury in Ivforch 2006, tbere wos no definitive amount of attorneys fees 
relating solely to tlrnt point. Tbe case continued thrnugl1 trial in October 2006 on tlie Maile's 
counter-claim. One ccnmot objectively deterniine wben some damages were incuITed relating to 
attorney fees and us Sllcb t11ere is no res judicata defense. 
TI1e Respondents hcive 8r!::,'1Ied that tlie Appellants claims for legal malpr::ictice were 
frivolous. (Tuylor brothers' Reply B1iefp. 23). Tliis is a fallacious .1rgument on the pa1i oftlie 
Taylors, because tbe Appelfonts never ctlleged attorney malpractice. 
In tlie present matter tbe appelfonts claim :1rnong otlier things, the respondents were 
negligent in misrepresenting to tbe c:omi t]ieir clients' sic1tus as beneficiaries under tlie trust, 
when in prior sworn pleadings and p1ic,r testimony it was established that the Taylor brotliers' 
mother was the sole beneficiary of tl1e trust as a result of tbe Disclaimer Agreement. The 
attorneys prepared tl1e documentation containing tl1e pe1jured testimony, had previously prepared 
documents containing tl1e true facts, filed pleadings asseriing facts the attorneys lrnew were not 
tn,e, and lrnd participated in deposition and comi proceedings establishing the true fact tl1at tl1e 
Taylor brothers' mother was the sole beneficiary of the trust. 
TI1e allegations of the amended complaint allege conduct and an agreement between the 
Respondents to accomplish an unlawful objective. ( R. 000257). Sucl1 a civil conspiracy is not, 
by itself, a claim for relief. The essence of a cause of action for civil conspiracy is the civil wrong 
committed as tbe objective oftl1e conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself. Mmmos v. Moss, 143 Id. 
927, 931, 155 P.3d 1166, 1170 (2007). Such wrongful conduct give rise to a number of civil 
remedies, to wit: ( 1) the Taylor brothers and the attorney Respondents committed wrongful acts 
that are prohibited under the Idaho Racketeering Statue (Count Eleven); (.2) tbe Res1Jo11dents 
committed acts tl1at constitute abuse of process (Count Five); (3) the Respondents committed a 
fraud upon tl1e comi (Count One); (4) the Respondents committed wrongful conduct in filing a 
verified pleading which \Vas diametrically opposite to an earlier verified pleading previously 
submitted by the Respondents before a11otl1er tribunal, requiring an imposition of a constructive 
trust (Count Two); (5) tl1e Respondents committed acts constituting negligence and/or 61--ross 
negligence (Count Six and Eight); (6) the Respondents committed acts whicb constitute equitable 
estoppel, quasi estoppel and/or judicial estoppel, (Counts Nine, Ten, and Twelve). 
The elements of negligence are well established:(]) duty; (1) breach; (3) causation; and 
(4) damages. fa;t:-ite of Bed:er v. Coll3Jrnn, 140 Id. 522,526, 96 PJd 623,627 (2004). As :1 
general rule, ~111 ottorney wi11 be held li,1ble for negligence only to his or lier dient and not to 
someone with whom tbe attorney cloes not have an ottorney-client relc1tionsbip. rforrigfeld v. 
Hancock, 140 Id. 134, 90 P.3d 884 (2004), Wick v. East1mm, 122 Id. 698,838 P . .2cl 301 (l9CJ2). 
However, our Supreme Court has indicated tl1Jt a cbirn cm1 exist between a non-client and an 
attorney for u cbirn of negligence. See McPheters v. Maile, 138 Id. 391,395, 64 P.3cl 3 I 7, 321 
(1003). 
A pariy is not hnrnune from liability for civil darnnges bc1secl upon tha.t 
pmiis fraud engzigecl in during p1ior litigation proceedings. Matsuura v. E.I. Du Pont De 
Numbers, 102 Hawaii 149, 73 P.3d 687 (2003). A third pc1rty c:.-111 hold a lawyer lioble iftlie 
attorney exceeds the scope of his employment or acts for personal gain or substcmtially assisting 
in a client's breach of fiduciary duty. Attorneys must not knowingly counsel or assist a client in 
committing a crime or fraud. Taylor v. JvfcNichols, supra. Tlie Appell:mts h:we alleged 
sufficient facts ogainst the c1ttorneys indicating the attorneys actively p,1rticipated in perpetrnting 
a fraud upon the court which crecited dmm1ges to tbe Appellants. 
Tlie Appellants were denied the opportunity to present their case against the trust before 
Judge Wilper. Tlie pe1jury by the Taylor brothers gave Judge Wilper tbe wrongful impression 
thc1t tbe Taylor brothers were bt·neficiaries and had c1 financial interest in the corpus of tl1e trnst in 
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2006. In truth, the Taylor brotbers bargained away their interests in the trust to gain control of 
tbe trust in 1004 to advance a lawsuit by the trust when tbeir own l:Jwsuit was dismissed. The 
AppeIL:mts have aileged valid claims against the respondents wbich ::ire not barred by tbe doctrine 
ofres judicata. 
E. A Application of Law of tbe Case Does Not Apply Because of Respondents' Criminal 
Behavior. 
Fraud vitiates everything it touches. Tusch Entel]Jrises v. Coffin 113 Id. 37, 740 P.1d 
I 022 (l 987). Fraud upon the court makes void the orders and judgments of that court. An 
attempt to commit "fraud upon the corni" vitiates the entire proceeding and deprives tbe court of 
subject matter jurisdiction. In re Village of Willowbrook, 37 Ill. App.2d 393 (1961). A decision 
produced by fraud upon the court is not in essence a decision at all, and never becomes final. 
Fraud vitiates a judgment caused by t1ie active agency of some party to the proceeding, as the 
court is misled and deceived as to the facts upon which it attempts to administer the law, and the 
mistake is equally efficacious in procuring a wrong. Trim v. Trim, 33 So.3cl 471 (Miss. 1010). 
The Respondents' criminal bebavior constitutes a fraud upon the corni and dep1ives the 
corni of subject matter jurisdiction. There can be no law of case under tbese facts. Under the law 
of tbe case doctrine, wben "tlie Supreme Cou1i, in deciding a case presented states in its opinion 
a principle or rule of lmv necessary to the decision, sucli pronouncement becomes the law of tbe 
case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the district comi mid 
upon subsequent appeal." Tbe rule is well establislied and long adhered to in this state tbat 
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wl1ere, upon an appeal, the Supreme Court, in deciding a case states in its opinion a principle or 
mle of law necessJry to the decision, sucl1 pronouncement becomes tbe lzrw of the case, and must 
be Z1cll1ered to thrnughout its subsequent pro61Jess, botl1 in the triul court and upon subsequent 
appecil .... '' In re Barker v. Fischbacl1 & Moore, Inc., 110 Jcl. 871, 872, 719 P.2cl 1131, 1132 
( I 986)(citing S uitts v. First Security Bank ofidaho, l l O Id. 15, 713 P.2c1 13 74 (1985) ). 
The present action is an independent action under I.R.C.P. Rule 60 to set aside a 
jud,gment based upon fraud upon the corni ::md for claims for damages as a result of litigation 
misconduct by the Respondents. Tl1e law of tl1e case doctrine lrns no application to the cuITent 
proceedings. The Respondents ar611.1ed that the stJncling of tl1e Tayfor was ''law of tbe case" 
before the district comi (Taylor brotliers' Reply Brief p. 9). However, under the "law of tbe 
case" principle, on 21 second or subsequent appeal tl1e comis generally wiJl not consider errors 
wbich arose prior to tbe first appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier 
appeal. See 5 Arn. Jur..'.2d Appecil and Errnr § 752 (1962). TI1e doctrine discourages piecemeal 
appeals and is consistent with tl1e broad scope of clziim preclusion under the analogous doctrine 
f . · ''·ct T ' L] l ]'YJJd q-') "4iP 1 d°C'8(CA 199'1). o 1 es JUOica a .. ::in11c1n v. r a e, -'-- . _ :L, o _ ·-'- -o . . _ . 
Respondents' contention that ''law of the case" applies, is errnneous, because this case is 
not Jbout standing but rntl1er tl1e effects of criminal behavior in obtoining ajud!:,rr11ent. If the l;nv 
of tbe case is strictly applied there coulcJ never be a Rule 60(B) independent action filed when 
there are allegations of criminal conduct tl1::tt amow1t to tampering ·with the administration of 
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justice. Fraud upon tbe co Lui "will be found only in tbe presence of such tampe1i11g with tbe 
c1dministration of justice c1s to suggest a wrong agc1inst the institutions set up to protect and 
safeguctrcl tbe public. Compton v. Compton, 101 Jcl. 328,334,612P.2cl1175, l 181 (1980), 
quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. F-:fortforcl Empire Co., 32:2 U.S. 238,246 (1944). 
V/hen an issue of standing is raised, the focus is not on the merits of the issues rnised, but 
upon the prniy who is seeking tl1e relief. Seema Inc. v. Green Vvillow Trust, 133 Id. 283,286, 
985 P .2d 1145, 1148 (l 999). There is no present issue raised by tbe Appellants concerning the 
standing of the Taylor Brotbers. Simply because one ]ms standing to sue, tlrnt does not c1fford the 
rigb tor privilege to obtain a judgment basecl upon pe1ju1y that deprives m1 opposing pmiy their 
rigbt to m1 adjudication of their claims and defenses. There is no "law of the case'' that applies to 
tl1e present claims. 
F. Tl1e Consideration of Extrinsk Evidence and Paro! Evidence Is Permissible in 
Establishing Tlrnt the Taylor Brothers Committed Perjury and Obtained Money by False 
Pretenses. 
Tbe T3yJor brotbers tbemselves knew wb3t their beneficial interest in tbe trust was after 
tl1ey executed tbe Disclaimer Agreement in 2004. Tl1e Taylor brotl1ers knew tbe trutb of the 
misrepresentation as it was solely witbin their intention. There bas been no judicial 
dete1111ination that the Taylor brotl1ers remained beneficiaries after the .2004 Disclaimer 
A6'1·eerne11t. Tbe Taylor brotbers ar6'1.le tlrnt tl1e letter of April 2004 aut11ored by Con11ie Taylor is 
inadmissible cis pc1rol evidence. (T::iylor brothers' Reply Brief p.22). Tb ere is no merger under 
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these circumstances. Tlie Respondents failed to strike the letter from consideration before the 
lower comi and are precluded from arguing new matter at the appellate level. 
A latent ambiguity exists where an instrument is clear on its face, but loses that clarity 
when applied to tbe facts as they exist. Cool v. Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass'n, l 39 Id. 
770, 772, 86 P .3cl 484) 486 (2004 ). Although parol evidence generally cannot be submitted to 
contradict, vary, add or subtract from the tenns of a written agreement that is deemed 
unambiguous on its face, there is an exception to this general rule where a latent ambiguity 
appears. Salfeety v. Seideman ( In re Estate of Kirk), 127 Icl. 817,824,907 P.2d 794, 801 
( 1995). W11ere tbe facts in existence reveal a latent arnb(§,'11ity in a contract, the court seeks to 
dete1mine the intent oftbe pm1ies at the time tbey entered into the contract. Knipe Land Co. v. 
Robertson, 2011 WL 2039635 (Idabo 2011). 
The two letters authored by Connie Taylor ( R. 000535, 00056]) like any other fo1111 of 
evidence can be used to demonstrate inconsistent statements and impec1ch the one who uttered 
such a statement The letters, like tbe Taylor brothers' sworn testimony, contradict tbe Taylor 
brot11ers' and their counsels' allegation that a typo~·rap11ic,1l error existed in the verified petition 
in November 2004. Connie Taylor's letter of April 14, 2004 is proximately related in time to the 
sworn statements under oath a few months later contained in tbe verified petition in the probate 
proceedings on November 12) 2004. The letters in the record are yet additional examples 
evidencing the Respondents' c1iminal conduct. 
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G. The A .. ppeHants Were Deprived of Their Fu..mda.menfaJ Right to Faidy and Fully 
Adjudicate Their Cfa.ims Before Judge Wilper. 
Tbe Taylor brothers argue that there is no consequence, even if tbey committed peijrny to 
obtain a jud,gment. Tbe Taylor brothers argue the land transaction was declared void and 
rescission was not an issue for detern1ination. (Taylor brotbers' Reply B1ief p. 11 ). The case of 
State v. Wolfrum, 145 Id. 44, 175 P.3d 206, (Ct. App. 2007), in defining tbe elements ofa charge 
of peijury, explain that tbe test for materiality is wbether the testimony probably could influence 
a couii on tbe issue before it. TI1e false statement need not bear directly upon tl1e ultimate issue 
of fact. Tbe de61ree of materiality is not imporiant.... Jt is sufficient tliat it was material, and migbt 
have been used to affect such proceeding. 
Altbough the AppeIIants requested Judge Wilper to balance the equities between the trust 
and tbemselves, Judge Wilper denied such a requests. AII that remained in Judge Wilper's 
opinion was a t1ial on the unjust eruichrnent claim relating to the enhanced value of the forty acre 
parcel improved by tbe Appelbnts. The Respondents fail to address tbe esta.blished case law in 
Idaho wbich allows a claim to title and possession ofreoJ propeity when the Stah1te of Frauds is 
violated. Tbe Appellants were led to believe by the Taylor brothers' predecessor, Beth Rogers 
that the trust would bonor the real estate transaction. Based upon written assurances, the 
Appellants proceeded to incur building costs to their detriment. Because Judge Wilper be! ieved 
t11e Taylor brothers were beneficiaries no detern1ination was made involving tbe rebtionship 
between tbe trnst and the Appellants. Judge Wilper's Comi never resolved any of the issues 
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smTounding the detriment to tlie Mailes of investing monies to develop real property acquired in 
a transaction tlrnt il1e successor trustee Beth Rogers assured tl1ern the trust would J1011or. (R. 
00053()). 
The case of G1mer v. Bartsclii, 139 Id. 430, SO P.3d l 031 ('.2003) provides tlie elements 
of quasi-estoppel. The Garner, supra, case held: 
Qu::i.si-estoppel prevents a p:11iy from reaping an unconscionable ;:1clvm1tage, or 
from imposing an unconsciom1ble disadvantage upon another, by changing 
positions. Lunders v. Estate of Snyder, 131 Jd. 689,695,963 P.'.2d 37'2, 378 
( I 998). Quasi-estoppeJ, unlike equitable estoppel, does not require 
misrepresentation by one pmiy or cictual reliance by the otber. .. 
The elements of quasi-estoppel liave been defined as follows: 
[I]t precludes a pmiy from asseriing to another's disadvantage a rig]1t inconsistent 
with a position previously taken by him or her. TJ1e doctrine applies wJ1ere it 
would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent 
with one in which he acquiesced or ofwhicli be accepted a benefit. The act oftbe 
pariy against wl1om t]1e estoppel is sought must bave gained some advantage to 
himself or produced some disadvantage to anotlier; or the person invoking tl1e 
estoppe] must have been induced to cbange his position. 
Jf a contract is illegal and void, the comi wiJJ Jeave the pmiies as jt finds t]1em and refuse 
to enforce tl1e contract. Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint Scl10ol Dist.# 401, 147 Id. 277,287,207 
P.3d l 008, l 018 (2009). Jf a land transaction is fu]ly perforn1ecl and all the obligations attempted 
to be done by sucl1 contract became accomplislled facts, tl1e m:mner in whicl1 tl1e contract was 
first executed is no longer tl1e controlling issue. FaITar v. Parish, 42 Id. 451,245 P. 934 (I 926). 
The Appellants were denied tbeir day in corni relating to the remedies available witb tbe 
trust, as referenced by Justice Eismann, in Taylor v. Maile II. Judge Wilper precluded sucl1 an 
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adjudication solely ;:c1s a result of the criminnl bebavior of tl1e Respondents. 
H. me Jury Verdict Cm Not Stand. 
Tbe Taylor brothers asseri tlrn.t the Appell,mts' filing of tbe pe1jury complaint was with no 
legitimate factual or legal basis and was a violation of l.R.C.P. Rule 1 J (a)(1), which is 
sanctionable under Jdabo Code§ 12-123, which demonstrates an improper use ofthe legal 
system. (Taylor brothers' Reply Brief p. 15). The appellants bave never been sanctioned under 
Rule J 1 either by Judge Wilper or Judge Greenwood. Tbe Taylor brotbers specifically requested 
snnctions against the appellants, for tbe filing of a motion to foreclose tbeir venclee's lien in 
Judge Wilper's Court and at tbe same time proceeding witb tbe crnTent action before Judge 
Greenwood. Judge Wilper on March 10, 2010, entered his Order Denying Defendants' Motion 
for Foreclosure ofVenclee's Lien and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Sanctions. ( R. 001614). 
Being fully appraised of the record in both his case and Judge Greenwood's case, Judge Wilper 
stated, ''the Comi finds tlrnt Defendants' motion to foreclose tbe vendee's lien is not witbout a 
basis in law or fact and was reasonable under the circumstances. Plaintiffs' motion for sanctions 
is denied''. ( R. 001618). The very fact tlrnt tbe Judge Wilper found in March 2010, tk1t tl1ere 
were no sancti onable offenses in proceeding witl1 two cases in litigation, makes it even hard er to 
understand how a jmy could disa,gree. Tbe point of.Judge Wilper's detern1ination shows tlrnt 
litigants, such as the Appellants, had a reasonable basis to pursue tbe exact course of action 
u11de1iaken by the appellants. There can not be a finding tlrnt there was a willful improper use of 
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legal process in the regular course of the proceeding, and/or (2) tbe act was committed for an 
ulterior, improper purvose. lf it were otberwise Judge Wilper would b:1ve sanctioned t11e actions 
of the Appellants in l'v1arch 20 I 0. TI1ejury verdict unden11ined the prior ruling by Judge Wilper 
yvhich was cletern1ined upon the same record which tbe jury considered. Tbe Verclict therefore 
cannot stuncl. 
Tbe appell::mts voluntarily withdrew tbeir Notice of Lis Pend ens on July] 3, 2009 in 
Judge Greenwood's proceedings some 10 days after Judge Greenwood·s Memornndum Decision 
,me! Order dismissing the Appellants' complaint. Earlier, in Judge Wilper case, Judge \ViJper 
had ordered tJrnt a lis penclens could be maintuinecl during an ::ippeal. 
Judge \Vilper ruled upon tbe T:::iy!or brothers' motion to strike the Lis Pendens which was 
filed prior to the Judge Wilper appeal. T11e Taylors brotbers in tbe litigation before Judge Wi}per 
in 2007, requested tliat his couri strike the Lis Pendens filed in May 2006 ancl/or requested that a 
bond be posted during the appeal. Judge Wilper entered his Order on March 1, 2007 denying the 
motion. Pursuant to that order the lis pen dens was authorized to remain ofrecord. ( R. 001393-
001409). As early as Marcb 1, 2007 the Appellants k.new tlrnt they h:id a rigl1t to maintain a lis 
pend ens even during ::111 ~,ppeal. The appellants volunt::irily released the Notice of Lis Pend ens 
long before the present appeal was filed. Under tbe prior judicial detennination by Judge Wilper, 
litigm1ts were entitled to maintain a lis pendens even during an :lppeal. Neither the Taylor 
brotbers nor the trust could have been damaged by the filing of the lis pendens before Judge 
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Greenwood, because tlie appellants are entitled to maintain a ]is pendens even during the 
appellate process. 
Botb lis pen cl ens were properly recorded and m:isonab]y connected to the litigation. 
Although, teclmically, the Appellants could have maintained tbe lis pend ens througb an appeal in 
tbe clm-ent case (as allowed by Judge Wilper drning the appeal in Taylor v. Maile), the 
Appellants voluntarily removed the same. Likewise, tlie lis pendens was substituted with a 
Vendee's Lien in tbe Judge Wilper matter. ( R. 001421, 001427-001429). Judge Wilper had 
approved tlie Venclee's Lien as a mechanism to protect tbe Appellants' rigbt to payment. Tbe 
Appellants filed their Verified Motion to Foreclosure the Vendee's Lien in November 2009. ( R. 
001445). Until tbe purchase price was returned, pursuant to I.C. § 45-1302, AppeJlants were 
entitled to maintain their lis pendens. 
54 C.J.S. Lis Pend ens § 10 provides: 
§ 10. GeneraIJy 
171e doctrine oflis pendens applies to al] suits or actions whicb directly affect real 
properiy. In some states, tl1e cause of action must involve some legal interest in 
tbe clrnilenged real properiy in order for Iis pendens to apply. Similarly, in otber 
st:Jtes, a notice of lis pendens is autborized only as to a suit in whicb real prope1iy 
is "involved," which refers onJy to realty actually and directly brougbt into 
litiga6on by pleadings in a pending suit and as to whicb some relief is sought 
respecting that pmiicular property. A classic example of a suit in which real 
properiy is "involved" is a suit which seeks to bave a prior conveyance oftbe 
properiy set asjde or declared null and void. Lis pendens applies to all claims 
affecting title to real properiy, use and occupation of property, and interest in 
properiy. 
However, Iis pen dens generally applies not only to tbose actions wbich involve 
t]ie question of title or a possessory interest but also to litigation that does not seek 
-,-, 
.J .J 
to change the ownership ofland in any way but does involve a deten11ination of 
certain rights and liabilities incident to ownership. Tims, lis pendens applies to 
actions which are brougbt to enforce any lien, charge, or encumbrance against real 
property. Further, it is not improper to file a lis pendens pursuant to an action 
seeking equitable relief with respect to the property that is the subject of the lis 
pendens. 
The claims before Judge Wilper related initially to title and tl1ereafier to equitable rights 
affecting the Linder Road properiy. The Vendee's Lien certainly qualifies as a legal proceeding 
which involve a detern1ination of cerioin rights and liabilities incident to ownership. I.C. § 45-
1301 clearly establishes this JJroposition and as such there was no actionable wrong committed 
by any of tl1e Appellants. 
The Appel fonts asse1ied a variety of claims. The Appellants requested a constructive 
trust to be imposed based upon the fraudulent and crirnfoal activity of the Respondents. In 
addition, the Appellants requested relief under the Idaho Racketeering Statute. 
The language uncler I.C. § 18-7803 and§ 18-7804 clearly provides tbat a claim only arises as a 
result of acti vfry amounti11g to the specific statutory criminal activity that is precisely alleged to 
lrnve occuITed in t11e present matter. Specifically the Statutes provide: 
18-7803 DEFTI\!ITIONS. 
As used in this chapter, (a) "Racketeering" means any act which is chargeable 
or indictable under the following sections of the Idabo Code or which are 
equivalent acts cbargeable or indictable as equivalent crimes under the laws of any 
other jurisdiction: 
(10) Fraudulent practices, false pretenses, insurance fraud, financial 
transaction card crimes and fraud generally (sections 18-2403, 18-2706, 18-3002, 
18-3101, 18-3124, 18-3125, 18-3126, 18-6713,41-293,41-294and41-1306, 
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Jcl:ilw Code); 
(17) Pe1:jury (sections 18-5401 and 18-5410, Idal10 Cocle); 
18-7804 PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES -- PENALTIES. 
(:1) It is unlawful for any person wJ10 k1s received any proceeds derived 
directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketee1ing sctivity in whicb tl1e person 
has participztted, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, ony pa1i of the proceeds or 
tlie proceeds derived from the investment or use thereof in the scquisiticm of any 
interest in, or the establishment or opera lion of, any enterprise or real property. 
One of tl1 e remedies available under tbe § 18-7804 is a return ofreal prope1iy obtained as 
a result of the racketeering activity. Clearly tbe present m2ctter involved le6~timate claims to real 
prope1iy wbicl1 autl10Iized tbe filing oftl1e !is pen dens. Tl1e jury verdict was improper under 
either count which tl1e j1JJy was allowed to consider and tl1e verdict sl1ould be set aside. 
l The Rc,•,pondents A re Not Entitled to Attorney Fees nn Appeal. 
Tl1e Respondents have requested attorney fees pursuant to J.C. § 12-121, and I.A.R. 41. 
An award of attorney fees on appeal is approp1iate "if the law is well-settled ancl tbe appellants 
have made no substanti::d showing tl1at the clist1ict comi mis:1ppliecl the law,"' Keller v. Rogstad, 
112 Id. 484, 489, 733 P.2d 705, 710 (1987), quoting Davis v. Gage, l 09 Id. 1019, 1031, 712 P.2d 
n 0, 732 (Ct. App.1985). Under I.C. § 12-121, tl1e Corni may :1ward reasonable attorney fees to 
tl1e prev::1iling pa1iy in a civil action iftl1e appeilate corni is left witb the abiding belief that tl1e 
appeal ,vas brougl1t or clefenclecl frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Cromer v. 
Slater, 146 Id. 868, 881, 204 P.3d 508, 521 (2009). Tl1e Respondents 11::ive not met their burden 
for any mvard of attorney fees on appeal. 
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legitinrnte, trioble issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded under I.C. § 12-121 even 
tJ10ugl1 the losing party 11::is asserted factuol or legal cJ.::1ims tl1at are frivolous, unreasonoble, or 
witl10ut foundation. Judge Greenwood never detenninecl tlie action was frivolous, unrea.so11:1ble, 
or without foundation at tlie tri:il level. 
An action is not deemed to lrnve been brought frivolously simply bec:mse it ultima.tely 
fails. Edwards v. Donart, 116 Tel. 687,688, 778 P.2d 809,810 (1989). In deciding wbe.tber an 
cJWarcl of attorney's fees is proper, "tl1e sole question is whetl1er tbe losing party's position is so 
plainly follacious as to be deemed frivolous, unreasonable orwitl1out foundation." Sun Val1ey 
Sbopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idabo Power Co., 119 Id. 87, 92, 803 P.2cl 993, 998 (1991 ), quoting 
Severson v. Hern1ann, 116 Id. 497, 777 P.2d 269 (1989). A mispercepticm, by a party, oftbe law 
is not, by itself, urneasonable conduct. Automobile Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Icl. 874, g65 
P.2d 965 ( 1993), Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Id. 905,911, 684 P.2d 307, 313 (Ct. 
App.1984). 
It is of interest that none of the Respondents l1ave requested sanctions against Appellants 
for an improper oppeaI. Tl1e cunent appe1late involves the same principles of law that were 
argued before the lower couri---- tl1e application ofresjudiccita, tl1e affects of a fraud upon a 
comt by officers of a eomi. Judge Greenwood allowed a trial on the merits relating to abuse of 
process :md intentional interference with business uclvantage reasoning tbc1t tbe legal proceedings 
pursued hy the Appellants were for improper purpose, to harass and to increase il1e course of 
37 
IitigatiC1n. J\/ot only were tbose legc1l principles ,1dva11cecl in good foitl1 in the district court before 
Judge Greenwood, but il1e Appdla11ts are c1dv~111cing legiti111Me Jeg~1l principles in pointing out 
the criminal conduct Clf the Respondents in obtaining the Juclgme11t on Bcnllefidaries' Claims. 
lf an nppe[il clues not meet the :,t:1mbrcls of J.A.R. 11. l oncl "it is intc11)0Red for any 
improper purpose, sucl1 as to Jiarass or to cause unnecessary dc!ay or nccclless incre:1se in tlie cost 
oflitigation," tl1en this Court "sl1:ill irnpose upun the person who sign eel it, a represented party, or 
both, w1 appropriate sanction which rnoy include ... tl1e amount of reasonable expen:;es incumxl 
becm1se of the filing ... including a rea'.wnable sttorney's fee." Id.; Bowls v. Pro Jncliviso, Inc., 
l J'.2 Id. 3 71, 3 77, 97J P . .2cl 142, 148 (J 999), RodrigLtez v. Dept. of Correction, l 36 JdaJ10 90, 94, 
29 P.Jd -101, 405 (2001). Tbe Respondents hove not requested sanctions pursuant to I.A.R. J 1.1, 
cts there exfats 110 improper purposes at the Dppe!late level just as tl1ere was 110 improper puqmses 
at tlie trial level. 
In the present rnotter, tbe AppeJ!ants properly111ade a record demonstrating criminal 
activity 011 the pc1rt of tl1e Responclents in obtaining tJ1e .Tuclfo'lllent 011 Beneficiaries' Cbims. Sucl1 
claims :::ic1vmJced by the Appellants consisted entirely oftl1e Respondents' own sworn testimony, 
verified pleadings and statements against tlJeir interests. Tl1e A.ppeJlants properly alleged various 
tort claims in nddition to the fraudulent-criminal conduct of the Respo11dcnts mid attorneys fees 
cmcl costs can not be c1.ssessed against tl1e Appell::mts. Tl1e Appellants re::pectfully request tbot 
this Court deny tl1e Respondents' request for fees on appecd. 
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UV. CONCLUSION 
Let not ~111y uf us fe:1r die consequences of st111Lling up Jgainst crimin:il :1ctivity. V'/l1ctbt:.:i-
it be in !he siTcets ofMi~1mi or :1 cuurtlwusc in Boi:;e, Jd,1ho, Jct e:1ch of us he duty-bounJ tu 
pur~:ue wh:1t is right :111d trne. 
DA TED this 26[!1 day of September, 20 I) . 
.... ,.·.~1,·:···/,,,-:_:'._·_· .. ·~.-·.,·_· 1.'. /' 
,,.,,/c: ,},, ")· ~~ )-;~ ---(.- - r: 
TBOfifA,S G. JvIA!LE IV., pru se. { . , 
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CHRIST T. TRO{TPIS, counsel, for 
Appellants, 8erhd1ire Investments, Colleen 
M,1ile. 
V. 
CFRT!FiCATE OF MAlUNG 
f HEREBY CERTIFY :h:tt un this 26til cby of Sepkmlu·, .2(! l l, f rn:iik:d t·,vo (' J inie :ind 
t . /'I,- . ,l"'D~'LL~-..,,,..,c,,FCPJ"\.'P.1.)fJ:'-' I.'/ . ·1 corrcc copies or l,lc: rorego,ng ,;.J', t.: ,,J'< 1,.:i {L',_· ~f D,\..,_.r, riy p.:1L·m_c; 11t :;:ime ll1 t ·1e 
Vniit'd St:1k:s 'vLiil, pnstage prqx1id, ~,cldresf:eJ (IS follows: 
I
' Connie W. 
900 
Vancouver, Was11ington 98660 
Facsimile: (J60) 6CJ3-29l l 
Jvfork Stephen Prusynski 
PO Box 829 
Boise, ID 83 701 
I 
Phone: (208) 345-:2000 
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